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ABSTRACT
We investigate whether excessively optimistic beliefs play a role in the persistent demand for
doctoral and postdoctoral training in science. We elicit the beliefs and career preferences of
doctoral students through a novel survey and randomize the provision of structured information
on the true state of the academic market and information through role models on nonacademic
careers. One year later, both treatments lead students to update their beliefs about the academic
market and impact career preferences. However, we do not find an effect on actual career
outcomes two years postintervention.
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Pursuing a PhD and postdoctoral training are major human capital investments involving
several years of effort and substantial foregone earnings. As with earlier human capital
investments, the benefits of these postgraduate investments lie in subsequent career
opportunities. One such opportunity is the prospect of obtaining a tenure-track faculty position—
a job that comes with considerable nonmonetary attributes in terms of prestige, autonomy, and
flexibility, if not with greater pay.
However, becoming a tenure-track faculty member, particularly in the natural sciences in
the United States, has become incredibly difficult. In 2016, approximately 2,700 students
graduated with a PhD degree in chemistry, yet there were only 152 advertised openings for
chemistry faculty positions in U.S. research-intensive universities. 1 Only around 10 percent or
fewer of PhDs who become tenure-track faculty are in chemistry and the life and biological
sciences (Gaulé and Piacentini 2018; Sauermann and Roach 2016). Yet, despite the low
likelihood of ever becoming faculty, along with low postdoc salaries, many graduate students
pursue one or multiple postdoctoral positions, often with the hopes that it will increase their
chances to obtain academic employment (Hayter and Parker 2019).
The fact that the number of chemistry PhD graduates vastly exceeds the number of
faculty openings in many STEM fields has not escaped the attention of the science policy
community and has been the subject of recurring debates (e.g., Alberts et al. 2014; Cyranoski et
al. 2011; Freeman et al. 2001; Romer 2000; Sauermann and Roach 2016; Schillebeeckx,
Maricque, and Lewis 2013).

There are more than 200 research-intensive universities in the United States. Besides being relatively easy
to measure, placements in research-intensive universities are precisely those that junior scholars aspiring to an
academic career with a focus on research would target. The number of 152 openings is based on the results of a
community effort to help applicants by identifying all relevant positions (see http://chemjobber.blogspot.com/).
1
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Why do young scientists keep choosing to pursue PhD and postdoctoral training despite
the dwindling academic career prospects? One possibility is that postdoctoral training improves
nonacademic career prospects enough to be worthwhile even in the absence of academic career
options. 2 However, evidence suggests that nonacademic careers vary substantially in the extent
that they require doctoral training (Hayter and Parker 2019). Alternatively, the experience of
training itself may be appealing to graduate students, as scientists are drawn to the puzzlesolving nature of doing science (Dasgupta and David 1994; Merton 1973; Sauermann and Roach
2012; Stern 2004;). Meanwhile, for foreigners, visa considerations may steer individuals not just
toward graduate study, but also toward postdoctoral training, as universities are not to subject to
the same H1-B restrictions as private sector firms, which would allow them to more easily
remain in the U.S. (Amuedo-Dorantes and Furtado 2019; Ganguli and Gaulé 2020; Stephan and
Ma 2005).
In this paper, we consider another factor that may contribute to observed human capital
investment decisions: perhaps graduate students are not well informed about the state of the
academic job market, and these incorrect beliefs play a role in their career decisions, particularly
decisions to pursue postdoctoral training. 3 Prior studies suggest through qualitative and survey
evidence that individuals already in postdoc positions were indeed overly optimistic about the
likelihood of getting an academic job, and that junior scientists who had already advanced
beyond the PhD reported lacking information about nonacademic career options (Hayter and
Parker 2019; Sauermann and Roach 2016). Yet, it is unclear whether providing information
For example, having completed postdoctoral training may have signaling or certification value on the
labor market. Further, the knowledge gained through training may be applicable—and indeed highly valued—for
working in industry (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein 2008; Dasgupta and David 1994; Sauermann and Roach 2016;
Sauermann and Stephan 2010).
3
Entering science involves a series of choices—from choosing a major in college to deciding to embark on
a PhD and post-PhD career choices. Ideally, we would like to know how beliefs and information on the scientific
labor market shape decisions to pursue a scientific career at an early stage.
2
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about the academic market and nonacademic careers to chemistry PhD students prior to this
would have a causal impact on their beliefs and subsequent career choices and preferences.
In very different contexts, the economics literature has established that biased beliefs can
drive human capital investment decisions and that providing information can causally impact
subsequent educational choices (e.g., Dinkelman and Martinez 2014; Jensen 2010; Oreopoulos
and Dunn 2013; Wiswall and Zafar 2015). In these studies, individuals typically underestimate
the returns to education and thus underinvest in education or make suboptimal education choices.
We focus on postgraduate human capital decisions and ask whether beliefs are biased and
whether providing information about the academic and nonacademic labor markets can have a
causal impact on subsequent education investments and career aspirations, in particular,
preferences to pursue a postdoc and an academic career. We focus on a sample of chemistry
doctoral students at the top 54 U.S. chemistry departments using an original survey combined
with a field experiment. 4 In the baseline survey, we first elicit beliefs about the academic market
and publishing in top journals, as well as career preferences for different types of postgraduation
jobs, such as postdocs, industry, government, or teaching positions.
At the end of the survey, a random subsample of respondents received a message with a
link to a custom-built website providing information on actual historical placement records by
institution in a tabular format (historical information treatment). This treatment provides
structured information about the academic labor market. Another random subsample received a
message with a link to a webpage from the American Chemical Society (ACS), the main
professional society for chemists, listing profiles with photos and career information about

We focus on chemistry because it is a discipline that we are able to observe academic placements on a
systematic and accurate basis, thanks to the availability of a faculty directory (the ACS directory of graduate
research). No comparable data exists for biology or physics. However, tight academic labor markets and long
postdoctoral training are prevalent across the life and hard sciences.
4
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professional scientists in academic, industry, and government positions (role model treatment).
This treatment provides less-structured information about both the academic and nonacademic
labor markets, particularly through role models who work in nonacademic sectors, with whom
students would have little exposure to during their studies. Such role model interventions through
various media types have been shown to impact behavior in a variety of settings, including
among STEM students (e.g., La Ferrara 2016; Porter and Serra 2020).
The last randomly drawn subsample, the control group, did not receive any message. One
year after the baseline survey, we conducted a follow-up survey with the respondents of the
baseline survey. In order to track how beliefs changed over time and whether the information
interventions caused differential adjustments in beliefs, we asked respondents the same questions
about their expectations about the academic job market.
Our first result is that at baseline, doctoral students in our sample are excessively
optimistic, both about the state of the academic market in their field and about publishing in top
journals. When we ask respondents to declare their beliefs about the share of peers from their
program eventually obtaining a tenure-track position in a U.S. research-intensive university, only
a third of respondents have beliefs in the correct range, with the rest being either mildly or
widely overoptimistic. Being overly optimistic in turn correlates with stated preferences for
doing a postdoc and academic careers more generally.
Interestingly, respondents were more optimistic about their peers’ chances of obtaining a
tenure-track position in a research-intensive university than about their own chances. Similar to
Sauermann and Roach (2016), who show that graduate students in older cohorts are less likely to
plan on doing a postdoc and are less interested in academic careers, we find that students further
along in their programs are less likely to hold overoptimistic beliefs about their chances in the
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academic job market. Foreign students were more likely to hold overoptimistic beliefs. Female
students were more optimistic than male students about the prospects of their peers, but not about
their own chances of becoming faculty.
Turning to the experiment, we estimate the causal impact of each information
intervention on beliefs and preferences for different careers one year later. We find that both
types of information (historical information treatment and role model treatment) led to a
downward adjustment in beliefs about respondents’ own chances of becoming faculty,
particularly among those who had more optimistic initial beliefs. Yet, we observe no significant
impact of either type of information on beliefs about the share of graduates from their program
eventually becoming faculty.
We also examine impacts of the interventions on satisfaction with pursuing a PhD. We do
not observe an effect of the historical information treatment on satisfaction with pursuing a PhD,
but the role model treatment did lead to small decline in satisfaction. Interestingly, we do find
that the historical information treatment led to an increase in the perceived attractiveness of an
academic career. To the extent that the historical placement information made respondents
realize that becoming a faculty member is more difficult than they expected, this may have
reinforced the perceived attractiveness of academic careers. The role model treatment,
meanwhile, increased the perceived attractiveness of government research and development
positions and reduced the preference for doing a postdoc, suggesting that exposure to
nonacademic career options can impact career preferences.
We also examine longer-run outcomes by collecting data on actual placements for the
subsample of chemistry students who completed their PhDs after the baseline survey two years
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later. For this sample, we do not see any significant effects in their actual career choices,
including doing a postdoc after the PhD.
In sum, we find that the beliefs of chemistry PhD students are often biased, and providing
historically accurate information leads to an adjustment in beliefs, especially among those who
initially had higher beliefs. Moreover, providing less structured information about nonacademic
careers impacts preferences for these careers. Yet, these changes in beliefs lead to limited
changes in career aspirations in the longer run, and we do not detect impacts on actual career
outcomes. Taken together, these results provide further questions about the role of information in
postgraduate human capital investments.
There are several possible reasons for the limited estimated effects on stated career
aspirations and actual outcomes. First, it could be that other preferences known to drive
scientists’ behavior (e.g., puzzle-solving nature of doing science or prestige) are already quite
strong at this point in training, so that there was minimal impact of the information on actual
career preferences and choices. Second, given the sequential nature of educational choices, and
that these are individuals who are already far along in their training trajectory with little option
value, switching costs may be high (Stange 2012). Third, the experience of going through
postdoctoral training may be enjoyable in itself or may be desirable for visa or dual-career
considerations. Finally, postdoctoral training is still valued in many industry and government
positions.
While we cannot differentiate between these explanations in the current study, our
findings nonetheless suggest that there is a strong rationale for departments to provide better
career information, about both academic and nonacademic careers, to prospective and actual
students, and there seems to be demand for such information (Sauermann and Roach 2016).
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Providing better information would ensure that the choices are made with full knowledge of what
they imply, and the costs of collecting and sharing information on placements are low.
In addition to these implications for the postgraduate labor market, this paper contributes
to the growing literature on biased beliefs and overconfidence. The prevalence and implications
of biased beliefs and overconfidence has been documented across many domains (Malmendier
and Taylor 2015), such as labor supply (Mueller, Spinnewijn, and Topa 2018), the housing
market (Armona, Fuster, and Zafar 2019), risky behavior (Dupas 2011), and returns to schooling
(Bleemer and Zafar 2018; Loyalka et al. 2013; Wiswall and Zafar 2015). Notably, ours is the
first study that investigates the existence of biased beliefs in the educational choice to pursue
postgraduate studies, postdoctoral studies in particular, and estimates how these beliefs are
impacted by the provision of objective information about the labor market.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section explains the institutional context.
The third section describes the data and experimental design. The fourth section presents the
results, and we end with the discussion in the final section.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
In this section, we discuss entry into scientific careers with a specific focus on chemistry
and academic careers in the United States. The entry into scientific careers is characterized by
long periods of training. A PhD degree typically takes six years and is often followed by one or
several postdocs. 5 The chemical and pharmaceutical industries, as well as the government, are
major employers of chemistry PhD graduates, and graduates can enter into industry positions

In the extreme case, a small but significant proportion of postdocs end up as “permadocs,” doing several
subsequent postdoctoral trainings without ever advancing to another level (Powell 2015).
5
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before or after postdoctoral training. Despite these human capital investments into becoming a
professional researcher, many doctoral degree holders employed in industry do not actually
conduct research in their jobs (Lautz et al. 2018).
A necessary condition for becoming a tenure-track professor in chemistry at a researchintensive U.S. university is earning a doctoral degree. However, in chemistry and other natural
sciences, postdoctoral training has become de facto an additional prerequisite, with direct
transitions from obtaining a PhD degree to a tenure-track position essentially unheard of. In other
words, postdoctoral training is crucial for being competitive for faculty positions. As a postdoc,
junior scientists build their publication portfolios, apply for grants, and gain additional scientific
and professional skills. Yet, the vast majority of postdocs do not become tenure-track faculty
members. Around a third of chemistry graduate students pursue postdocs, but less than 10
percent of graduating students are in a tenure-track position in a research-intensive U.S.
university five years after graduation (Gaulé and Piacentini 2018). Such low odds have been
documented in other disciplines and countries (Stephan 2012b).
Postdocs receive comparatively low levels of compensation during their postdoctoral
training. For example, postdocs receive on average a 31 percent lower hourly wage than an
average U.S. worker regardless of the education level (Stephan 2013). The opportunity cost of
choosing a three-year postdoc instead of working in industry was estimated to be around $60,000
in 2012 (Stephan 2012a). Kahn and Ginther (2017) find that in biomedicine, compared with
peers who started working outside academia immediately after finishing their graduate studies,
those who finish a postdoc earn less when they actually start to work. They also find that
postdocs forgo about one-fifth of their earnings potential in the first 15 years after finishing their
doctorates, which amounts to more than $200,000.

8

While information on career prospects for scientists is often available from professional
associations and other sources, departments generally provide relatively little career information
to prospective and current graduate students. Prior to the launch of this study, we visited the
websites of 56 chemistry departments in our sampling frame (see Appendix B) looking for their
graduate degree holders’ placement information. For 70 percent of departments, we could find
no placement information at all. The remainder typically provided examples of institutions that
have hired their graduates or aggregate data on placement by broad industry categories. One
notable exception was the Princeton chemistry department, which provided lists of graduates and
their placements at the conclusion of PhD. See Appendix C for more details on placement
information available from departmental websites.

DATA AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We combine two surveys of chemistry graduate students with a field experiment, linked
to the data on individual publications and career choices. The surveys provide rich descriptive
data on respondents’ beliefs and aspirations and how they evolve over time. To overcome
potential hypothetical bias, we combine the data on hypothetical job preferences with real job
preferences from hand-collected placement data of the survey respondents who finished their
PhDs after the baseline survey. We also leverage data from faculty directories, PhD theses, and
publications from an ongoing project on the production of knowledge in chemistry (see Catalini,
Fons-Rosen, and Gaulé, forthcoming; Gaulé 2014; Gaulé and Piacentini 2018). Our research
design and data collection approach is summarized in Figure 1.
Our analysis and intervention is based primarily on a survey we conducted in fall 2017
(hereafter baseline survey) and a follow-up survey one-year later. To construct the sampling
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frame, we first identified the set of 54 research-intensive U.S. universities that rank highest in the
Academic Ranking of World Universities (Shanghai Ranking) in its chemistry subject ranking.
These schools have large PhD programs, and their students are presumably comparatively better
placed for the academic job market. We gathered the names and emails of all individuals
(n=9,141) that were listed as graduate students in the chemistry departments of these universities,
either on graduate student directory websites or on individual laboratory websites. We then sent
them email invites to complete a survey using the Qualtrics online survey platform. 6
We received a total of 1,330 responses corresponding to a response rate of 15 percent. 7
The baseline survey included a set of basic demographic questions, as well as questions on
undergraduate education, year of enrollment in the PhD program, progress in the PhD program,
and field of specialization. We asked about career preferences using both standard Likert-scale
measures and counterfactual choice questions. Regarding beliefs, we asked respondents to rate
their chances of publishing in Nature, Science, or Cell—the most prestigious science journals—
to rate their chances of becoming a tenure-track faculty in a research-intensive university, and
the share of students in their program they believe eventually become tenure-track faculty in a
research-intensive university (see Appendix D for the exact survey questions). Finally, we asked
respondents whether they would agree to be contacted in a follow up survey and if so to provide
us with a permanent email address that we could use for future contact. Table A.1 in Appendix A
shows means and standard deviations for several key variables from the baseline survey.

To increase the response rate, we sent two reminder emails and offered a lottery with possibility of
winning one of 10 Amazon gift certificates worth $100 each. The choice of using this type of lottery was informed
by Sauermann and Roach (2013).
7
One issue we encountered was that some of the individuals we contacted reported having already
graduated, presumably reflecting the fact that some online directories and websites were not entirely up to date. We
excluded such responses from our analysis sample. Adjusted for the presence of students who already graduated
among the people we contacted, our response rate was around 18 percent.
6
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We combined the baseline survey with an information provision experiment. After
completing the baseline survey, respondents were randomly selected into either two treatment
groups or one control group. Treatment groups received one of the two versions of a thank-you
message via email with information related to the labor market, while the control group received
no message at all.
One of the messages contained more structured information (historical information
treatment), which linked to a custom-built website providing information on historical actual
academic placement rates by graduate institution in a tabular format. 8 These placement rates
were well below 10 percent for all institutions, so the information communicated was mainly an
update on the difficulty of becoming a tenure-track faculty in a research department.
The second message included less-structured information about nonacademic careers
(role model treatment), which linked to a real webpage from the ACS called “Chemists in the
Real World.” This website features pictures with job titles and profiles of professional scientists
in academic and (mostly) nonacademic positions (see Appendix F for the illustration of both
websites used in this study). 9 The role model treatment was intended to provide students with
information about both the academic and nonacademic careers through role models. Such role
model interventions through various modes, such as in person, websites, and television, have
been shown to impact behavior in a variety of settings (e.g., Porter and Serra 2020; see La

The historical placement records were based on previously collected data from Proquest Dissertations and
Abstracts and the ACS directory of graduate research (Gaulé and Piacentini 2018). Specifically, we collected data
on students graduating from U.S. chemistry graduate programs between 2008 and 2010 and matched their names to
a 2015 list of chemistry faculty in research-intensive universities. We then computed the share of graduating
students who had become faculty by 2015, by graduating department. For more details, see Appendix E. We
published this data, together with a detailed explanation how the data was constructed on the custom-built website
https://chemistryplacementdata.com/. The website was not advertised in any way. Web analytics confirm that the
overwhelming majority of visits to the website originated from the survey emails.
9
Available at https://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/careers/college-to-career/chemists.html (accessed August
12, 2020).
8
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Ferrara [2016]) by providing exposure to individuals with whom students otherwise would have
little interaction in their studies.
Not all respondents clicked on the links embedded in either message. While we did not
track individual usage, we estimated that roughly 35 percent of survey respondents who received
the link visited the custom-built website, versus around 1 percent of respondents in the control
group (we could not track clicks to the ACS website; see Appendix G for details).
The randomization procedure combined block randomization (stratified based on a
department’s Shanghai Ranking) with individual-level randomization in a subset of universities
(see Figure 1). 10 In order to measure the impact of the intervention on respondents’ beliefs and
plans, we contacted our respondents again roughly one year after the baseline survey and asked
them to complete a follow-up survey. 11 In the follow-up survey we repeated several questions
from the baseline survey. We again incentivized responses by sending two reminder emails and
offering a lottery to win a $100 Amazon gift certificate upon completing the survey. We obtained
500 complete responses, roughly 38 percent of the initial survey respondents. Table A.2 in
Appendix A reports means and standard deviations for several variables from the follow-up
survey. We complemented the follow-up survey with hand-collected information on the current
position of baseline survey respondents, such as whether they were doing a postdoc or working
in industry (for descriptive statistics, see Table A.3 in Appendix A). This information was

We created triads of departments of similar ranks, and within each triad assigned one department to the
information treatment, one to the control, and one to individual randomization. Thus, one university of three in the
block was randomly chosen as Treatment 1, so that all respondents to the baseline survey at this university received
the first message with historical placement rate information. For the second university, respondents were in the
control group. In the final university, survey respondents were individually randomized into one of the three groups
(historical information, role model, or control). An advantage of this design is that for the historical information
treatment, we have both individuals whose peers were also treated, and individuals whose peers were not treated.
This randomization design was intended to enable us to measure potential spillovers from the treatment, if the
treated individuals share information with their peers. However, sample size limitations prevent us from fully
leveraging this aspect of the randomization.
11
We excluded those who indicated in the first survey not to be contacted again.
10
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collected in the summer of 2019, roughly two years after the baseline survey. We collected this
information irrespective of whether individuals answered the second survey but only for students
who were expecting to graduate in 2017, 2018, or 2019 at the time when they were filling in the
baseline survey.
Table A.4 shows differences in the characteristics of respondents to our follow-up survey
to those who completed the baseline survey only. We see some differences in observable
characteristics, as students from higher-ranked programs, foreign students, and students further
along in the program were less likely to respond to the follow-up compared to those earlier in the
program. We estimate all regressions including these controls. Importantly, we do not see
differential attrition in the treatment group receiving the historical placement information
treatment. We do see a small decline in the group receiving the role model treatment. However,
for the actual outcomes collected, we have information for all baseline survey respondents, and
therefore attrition is not a concern for those outcomes.

RESULTS
Prevalence of Biased Beliefs
Do graduate students know how difficult it is to publish in the most prestigious scientific
journals, and to become a tenure-track faculty member in a research-intensive university? Are
individuals overconfident about their own ability; in particular, do they overestimate their
position in the ability distribution?
One way we measure biased beliefs is by eliciting respondents’ beliefs about their
chances of publishing as a first author in Nature, Science, or Cell before the end of their PhDs.
When testing the survey, we had been warned that this is a very rare event. Indeed, only 1 in 200
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chemistry PhD students reaches this milestone. 12 A group of 1,301 students thus would be
expected to collectively generate six or seven first-authored Nature, Science, or Cell
publications. Yet, by aggregating the beliefs of the respondents, we find that they expect to
collectively produce 310 first-authored Nature, Science, or Cell publications. Figure 2 plots the
distribution of the respondents’ beliefs about their chances of publishing in Nature, Science, or
Cell by the end of their PhD studies.
We also asked respondents to rate their own chances of becoming a tenure-track faculty
member in a research-intensive U.S. university. The distribution of those beliefs is displayed in
Figure 3. In recent years, the share of chemistry PhD students becoming faculty members was
around 5 percent. For instance, in 2016, a listing of chemistry faculty openings listed 152 tenuretrack positions in research-intensive U.S. universities, while 2,700 students graduated in this
same year. Our own calculations, which are based on matching names from comprehensive lists
of PhD graduates and faculty members in chemistry departments, suggest a similar rate. Again,
the respondents collectively display optimistic beliefs although to a lesser degree than for
Nature/Science/Cell publications. Specifically, if all the beliefs of the respondents were correct,
320 students in our sample would become tenure-track faculty members in a research-intensive
university, while only 66 of them would actually become faculty in chemistry departments based
on historical averages.
We also asked respondents about their peer beliefs—their beliefs about what share of
PhD students in their programs would eventually become tenure-track faculty members. By
asking about others in their program, we focus on information regarding the state of market. By

Authors’ calculations based on chemistry PhD graduates listed in Proquest and Nature/Science/Cell
bibliometric data.
12
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contrast, the beliefs about their own chances to become faculty also incorporates beliefs about
one’s own ability as well as preferences for the academic career.
The distribution of beliefs about the share of peers becoming faculty in research-intensive
universities is displayed in Figure 4. Interestingly, the mean beliefs about the share of students
becoming faculty (24.5 percent) are actually slightly higher than the mean beliefs about their
own chances to become faculty (24 percent). 13 So, what looked like an above-average effect
might be incorrect beliefs about the market as a whole. While there was some variation across
programs, no program had a share higher than 10 percent in the historic placement data. Slightly
less than 30 percent of the respondents answered between 0 and 10 percent, and thus essentially
had correct beliefs about the state of the market. A further 25 percent of respondents were mildly
optimistic, answering that between 11 percent and 20 percent of peers will become faculty. The
remainder—45 percent of respondents—were wildly optimistic, with answers far above the
observed average.
In summary, these descriptive statistics suggest that overoptimistic beliefs about
publishing and placement are widespread among graduate students. However, we also observe
heterogeneity in beliefs, with some individuals having correct beliefs, and others being biased to
various extents.
Who holds optimistic beliefs?
We now explore descriptively whether the heterogeneity in beliefs can be related to
observable characteristics. For this, we regress each of the three types of beliefs on student

As discussed earlier, both aggregate evidence and historical placement data suggest that this share is
around 5 percent.
13
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gender, foreign status, time since enrollment in the program, and a dummy variable for top-10
program (based on the Shanghai Ranking).
Table 1 displays the results. Foreign students are considerably more optimistic about
publishing and placement (Table 1, columns 1 and 2). Foreign students may be higher ability on
average due to a tougher selection to get into U.S. PhD programs (Gaulé and Piacentini 2013).
However, they also seem to be less informed about the tightness of the U.S. academic market
(Table 1, column 3). Perhaps surprisingly, studying at a top-10 school is not associated with
more optimistic beliefs.
While the literature has documented gender differences in overconfidence (e.g.,
Murciano-Goroff 2019; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007), we notably find few gender differences
in beliefs in our sample. We find that female and male students are equally likely to hold
optimistic beliefs about their chances to publish in Nature, Science, or Cell. Female students are
slightly more optimistic about the aggregate state of the academic market—that is, their peers’
chances of getting a tenure-track job (see Figures 5 and A.1)—but we observe no gender
differences in beliefs about one’s own chances.
Time since enrollment in the PhD program is a strong predictor of holding optimistic
beliefs: students in their first or second year of study are the most optimistic, though there is no
statistical difference between students in their third and subsequent years. The results are
consistent with Stephan and Ma (2005); Sauermann and Roach (2012, 2016); Sauermann and
Roach; and Gibbs, McGready, and Griffin (2015).
We also investigate whether holding optimistic beliefs about the share of students
becoming faculty is associated with preferences for academic careers (see Table 2). We measure
these preferences by asking how likely respondents are to do a postdoc or to choose a prestigious
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postdoc vs. an industry research job or a teaching position in a hypothetical choice question. 14
We find that respondents’ beliefs about the share of students becoming faculty is strongly
correlated with preferences for continuing an academic path. This holds despite the fact that we
are controlling for key observable correlates of holding optimistic beliefs, such as being a foreign
student or being in the first or second year of study.
As discussed earlier, in this discipline, moving straight from doctoral studies to tenuretrack positions is virtually impossible. However, by choosing postdoctoral training, a scientist
keeps open the possibility of subsequently landing a tenure-track faculty position, a job that she
often perceives to be highly desirable. The option to access this career path, while uncertain and
risky, is part of the returns to doing a postdoc. Students who underestimate how difficult it is to
obtain a tenure-track faculty position should thus be expected to find the postdoctoral option
more attractive, which is exactly what we find.
However, as in previous studies that have documented overoptimism among scientists
(e.g., Sauermann and Roach 2016), these results are descriptive in nature. We cannot rule out
that students who have optimistic or biased beliefs may also have other characteristics that drive
preferences for doing a postdoc. It is thus unclear whether exogenously inducing updates in the
beliefs could lead to changes in career preferences. The next section describes the results of the
intervention where we provided information to a random sample of the baseline survey
respondents, and then followed up with them one year later.

14

See Appendix D for wording of question.
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Effects of the Intervention
Our experimental design combined block randomization at the university level with
individual-level randomization for a subset of universities. Accordingly, survey respondents
were assigned to one of the following five groups: 15
1) Treatment 1 (historical information treatment)—block randomization: Students
received the email linking to the historical information on graduates’ placement, along with all
other survey respondents from the same university receiving the same link.
2) Control—block randomization: Students did not receive any email along with other
survey respondents from the same university not receiving any email.
3) Treatment 1 (historical information treatment)—individual randomization: Students
received the email linking to the historical information on graduates’ placement along with only
some of respondents from the same university receiving the same link.
4) Treatment 2 (role model treatment)—individual randomization: Students received the
email linking to the ACS profiles website along with only some respondents from the same
university receiving the same link.
5) Control (some peers treated)—individual randomization: Students did not receive an
email but some other survey respondents from the same university received the other types of
emails (Treatment 1 and 2).
We use the second group—those who did not receive any email with other survey
respondents from the same university not receiving any email—as the control group and the
15
Alternatively, we could pool treatment 1, block randomization, and treatment 1, individual
randomization, into a single variable. Results from the alternative specification are presented in Table A.5. The
results are qualitatively similar with this alternative specification except for the changes of the beliefs of own
chances to become faculty, where the effect of the historical placement intervention is just outside the significance
region (p-value-0.11 instead of 0.02 in the preferred specification) but the effect of the ACS profiles intervention is
significant.
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omitted category in all specifications. 16 Our variables of interest are indicator variables for each
of the other categories, or treatments, and we present specifications both with and without
controls.
We first consider the effect of the intervention on beliefs using the sample of students
who answered both the initial and final survey one year later. As in the descriptive analysis, we
observe two types of beliefs: the beliefs about peers (which share of students in their program
become faculty) and the self-beliefs (own chances of becoming faculty). Since we asked the
exact same questions on beliefs in the initial and final surveys, we can track the evolution of
beliefs over time and whether they were impacted by the treatment.
Tables 3 and 4 show the effect of the intervention on the changes in beliefs between the
two surveys (final minus initial beliefs). Note that the mean change in either type of beliefs is
negative, suggesting that students become more pessimistic over time. The point estimates for
the effect of all treatments on beliefs about the share of peers becoming faculty are small and
statistically insignificant. However, both the block-randomized historical placement information
treatment and the role model treatment had a statistically significant effect on the changes in
beliefs of own chances of becoming faculty, where receiving the information lowered beliefs
about one’s own changes of getting a tenure-track faculty position (see Table 4). The magnitude
of the effect is similar in magnitude to the mean of the dependent variable, suggesting that
individuals who received the information became less optimistic about their chances to become
faculty members at a faster rate than those who did not. The coefficients on both the individually
randomized historical information treatment and the “Some peers treated” group are smaller in
magnitude than for the block-randomized historical information treatment. This is consistent
We also estimate the treatment effects of the historical placement information when pooling the blockrandomized and individually randomized groups. See Table A.5.
16
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with the effects of the historical placement information being amplified when all peers received
the information, rather than only a small subset of individuals, likely by creating more
opportunities for discussions that made the information more salient.
It is puzzling that we find an effect of both types of information interventions on selfbeliefs but not on beliefs about peers. Prior to the intervention, we had expected that the
intervention might impact both types of beliefs and that, if anything, the effect might be weaker
for the beliefs of one’s own chances.
We next examine whether there was differential response to the treatments in who
updated their beliefs. Figure 6 shows that those with higher initial self-beliefs (those who are
most optimistic regarding their own chances of becoming faculty) were more likely to update
their beliefs in response to the historical information treatment. Table A.6 shows that for both
information treatments, the higher the baseline beliefs, the greater the decline in subsequent
beliefs. In Table A.7, we estimate heterogeneity in response to the treatment by our main
covariates: gender, foreign status, and a dummy variable for a top-20 program. Here we see that
there are not many significant differences, apart from a larger negative effect of both treatments
on the beliefs about peers among foreign students.
Now that we have established that the information treatment did impact beliefs about
one’s own chances of becoming faculty, we proceed to investigate whether the information
interventions impacted career preferences and actual career choices. For the latter, we can also
include baseline survey respondents who did not complete the final survey, as we code career
choices using publicly available information. Given that the historical placement information
intervention led to a downward adjustment in the beliefs of their own chances of becoming
faculty, we would expect postdocs to become less desirable in the treatment group (relative to the
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controls), and fewer people actually choosing postdocs. However, as Tables 5 and 6 show, we
find no effect of the historical placement information intervention on preferences for doing a
postdoc or actually taking up a postdoc position after graduation. 17
As for the role model intervention, we see a negative effect on the propensity to choose
the postdoc option in the counterfactual choice option, consistent with the role model
intervention making nonacademic careers more salient and attractive. However, we do not find
an effect on actual career outcomes.
Finally, we consider the effect of the interventions on additional outcomes: satisfaction
with the PhD as a career choice and perceived attractiveness of a faculty position and a
government research and development position. Surprisingly, we do not see an effect of either
intervention on satisfaction with pursuing a PhD as a career choice (Table 6). However, the
historical placement information did significantly increase the perceived attractiveness of an
academic faculty position (Table 7A). To the extent that the historical placement information
made respondents realize that becoming a faculty member is more difficult than they expected,
this may have counterintuitively reinforced the perceived attractiveness of academic careers. The
role model treatment meanwhile increased the perceived attractiveness of a government research
and development position (Table 7B). The ACS profiles page lists individuals in government
research positions, so this suggests that exposure to these profiles provided information that
students previously were not exposed to about government careers, which made them more
attractive as potential careers.

This finding echoes Sauermann and Roach (2016), who find in a descriptive analysis no systematic
evidence of a relationship between perceived demand for jobs in academia and the choice of postdoctoral training.
17
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DISCUSSION
This paper studies the beliefs of science PhD students regarding the academic job market
and how these beliefs impact their preferences for different types of careers and their decisions
upon graduating. It uses a novel survey of chemistry graduate students combined with the
randomized information interventions.
We find considerable evidence that graduate students are excessively optimistic regarding
the state of academic job market, their chances to become faculty, and their chances to publish in
the very best scientific journals. Students early in the program, as well as foreign students, are
more likely to hold excessively optimistic beliefs. Holding such beliefs is in turn associated with
intentions to engage in postdoctoral training after the PhD.
Providing information on historical placement rates and nonacademic career options
through role models appears to influence beliefs one year later, with treated individuals adjusting
their perceived chances of becoming faculty members. We find evidence that the historical
information treatment led to an increase in the perceived attractiveness of faculty positions, while
the role model treatment increased the perceived attractiveness of government R&D positions
and reduced the preference for doing a postdoc. However, we do not observe effects on
satisfaction with choosing the PhD as a career choice, nor do we see an effect of the
interventions on actual career choices two years after the PhD (for a subsample of respondents
who had graduated).
Taken together, these results provide further questions about the role of information in
postgraduate human capital investments. On the one hand, the beliefs of graduate students are
often biased, and providing historically accurate information leads to an adjustment in beliefs,
especially among those who initially had higher beliefs. On the other hand, the change in beliefs
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we induced experimentally lead to limited changes in career preferences and aspirations, and we
do not detect impacts on actual career outcomes.
There are several possible reasons for the limited effects on stated career aspirations and
actual outcomes. First, for various reasons, preferences for postdoctoral training may be quite
strong among this group. For example, it could be that other preferences known to drive
scientists’ behavior (e.g., prestige or the puzzle-solving nature of practicing science) are already
quite strong at this point in training, so there was minimal impact of the information on actual
career preferences and choices. Moreover, given the sequential nature of educational choices,
and that these are individuals who are already far along in their training trajectory, switching
costs may be high. Additionally, the experience of going through postdoctoral training may be
enjoyable in itself or may be desirable for visa or dual-career considerations. Finally,
postdoctoral training is still valued in many industry and government positions.
Another reason may be due to the types of information we provided. Perhaps a stronger
intervention impacting beliefs more soundly would lead to observable changes in actions. Only a
minority of individuals who received the link to the historical information treatment actually
acquired the information. Given the effects of the role model treatment, information provided
directly by the ACS or the students’ own department would give the information more
credibility. Additionally, our sample size was relatively limited, and having more statistical
power would have allowed us to test for further heterogeneity in which types of students
responded more or less to the information.
While we cannot differentiate between these explanations in the current study, our
findings nonetheless suggest that there is a strong rationale for departments to provide better
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career information, about both academic and nonacademic careers, to prospective and actual
students.
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Figure 1 Experimental Design
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Figure 2 Respondents’ Beliefs about Their Own Chances to Publish in Nature, Science, or
Cell
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Figure 3 Respondents’ Beliefs about Their Own Chances of Becoming Faculty
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Figure 4 Respondents’ Beliefs about the Share of PhD Graduates from Their Program
Becoming Faculty
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Figure 5 Beliefs of Own Chances and Peers’ Chances, by Gender

Figure 6 Initial vs. Posttreatment Beliefs
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Table 1 Who Holds Overoptimistic Beliefs?
(1)

Female

(2)
D.V.= Respondents’ beliefs
Own chances to publish in Own chances to become
Nature/Science/Cell
faculty
0.359
−1.155
(1.616)
(1.380)

(3)
Percentage of students
becoming faculty
2.396**
(0.971)

Foreign student

9.400***
(1.914)

8.343***
(1.587)

3.798***
(1.120)

Top-10 school

−1.897
(1.969)

−2.625
(1.679)

−1.349
(1.181)

First-year student

17.753***
(2.233)

9.789***
(1.890)

7.355***
(1.331)

Second-year student

9.512***
(2.152)

6.713***
(1.829)

4.558***
(1.287)

Third-year student

0.767
(2.200)

1.522
(1.874)

1.414
(1.319)

Obs.
Mean of D.V.
R2

1,301
24.907
0.073

1,333
23.953
0.048

1,330
24.472
0.039

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variables are the respondents’ beliefs regarding (1) their chances to publish
in Nature, Science, or Cell as a first author by the end of their PhD, (2) their chances to become tenure-track faculty in a researchintensive U.S. university, and (3) the percentage of students becoming become tenure-track faculty in a research-intensive U.S.
university. All the beliefs are expressed on a scale from 0 to 100. The omitted category for time in the program is fourth year and
above. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2 Optimistic Beliefs and Preferences for Academia

(1)
D.V.= Likelihood of doing a
postdoc
0.205***
(0.050)

(2)
D.V.= Choosing postdoc among
three options
0.086**
(0.038)

Female

−2.102
(1.743)

−2.559*
(1.350)

Foreign student

12.085***
(2.012)

10.575***
(1.586)

Top-10 school

−1.219
(2.139)

1.747
(1.640)

First-year student

6.000**
(2.401)

5.779***
(1.878)

Second-year student

3.566
(2.298)

3.599**
(1.801)

Respondents’ beliefs—share of students
becoming faculty

Third-year student
Obs.
Mean of D.V.
R2

1.897
(2.383)
1,271
54.155
0.055

−1.419
(1.832)
1,312
25.524
0.056

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variables are (1) the likelihood of doing a postdoc as reported in the
baseline survey (percentage out of one hundred), and (2) the likelihood (out of 100) of choosing the postdoc when offered a
counterfactual choice between a postdoc, research position in industry, or a teaching position (see Appendix D). The variable of
interest is the respondents’ beliefs of the share of students becoming faculty (also out of 100). The omitted category for time in the
program is fourth year and above. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3 Effect of the Interventions on Beliefs Regarding the Share of Students Becoming
Faculty
(1)

Historical placement info treatment
(block)

0.008
(1.664)

(2)
D.V.= Change in beliefs of the
share of students becoming faculty
0.612
(1.619)

Role model treatment

0.938
(2.182)

0.373
(2.583)

0.263
(2.052)

Historical placement info treatment
(individual)

1.184
(2.346)

1.000
(2.469)

0.154
(2.343)

Some peers treated
Obs.
Controls

1.004
(2.249)
500
None

0.239
(2.416)
500
Demographics, field

Mean of D.V.
R2

−3.520
0.001

−0.630
(1.867)
500
Demographics,
field + Initial beliefs
−3.520
0.374

−3.520
0.081

(3)

−0.416
(1.394)

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who answered both, the
initial and follow-up survey. The dependent variable is the change in beliefs of the percentage of students who will become faculty
(belief in the final survey minus belief in the initial survey). The coefficients reported correspond to four different indicators for
each treatment status (see main text for description). The omitted group is the group of survey respondents who did not receive a
thank-you message in universities where other respondents also did not receive a thank-you message. The specification (1) does
not include any controls. Specification (2) includes controls for gender, foreign status, field of study, time in the program, and
university rank. In specification (3) we additionally control for the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank which was used to stratify the block randomization.
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Table 4 Effect of the Interventions on Beliefs Regarding Own Chances to Become Faculty
Historical placement info treatment
(block)

(1)
(2)
(3)
D.V.= Changes in beliefs of own chances to become faculty
−5.995***
−5.002**
−3.071**
(1.625)
(1.807)
(1.428)

Role model treatment

−5.083*
(2.624)

−6.888**
(2.655)

−5.982**
(2.213)

Historical placement info treatment
(individual)

−2.882
(2.402)

−3.194
(2.559)

−2.015
(2.959)

Some peers treated

−2.144
(2.743)
500
−3.736
0.015

−3.540
(2.957)
500
−3.736
0.092

−2.689
(2.787)
500
−3.736
0.273

Obs.
Mean of D.V.
R2

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who answered both the
initial and follow-up survey. The dependent variable is the change in beliefs of the respondents’ own chances to become faculty
(belief in the final survey minus belief in the initial survey). The coefficients reported correspond to 4 different indicators for each
treatment status (see main text for description). The omitted group is the survey respondents who did not receive a thank-you
message in universities where other respondents also did not receive a thank-you message. Specification (1) does not include any
controls. Specification (2) includes controls for gender, foreign status, field of study, time in the program and university rank. In
specification (3) we additionally control for the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a
group of three universities of similar rank which was used to stratify the block randomization.
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Table 5 Effect of the Interventions on Post-PhD Career Choice
(1)

(2)
D.V.= Started a postdoc after PhD
0.018
(0.032)

(3)

Historical placement info
treatment (block)

0.008
(0.030)

Role model treatment

−0.066
(0.045)

−0.032
(0.042)

−0.026
(0.041)

Historical placement info
treatment (individual)

−0.054
(0.047)

−0.003
(0.043)

−0.007
(0.050)

Some peers treated

−0.043
(0.048)
574
0.181
0.006

−0.007
(0.053)
574
0.181
0.118

0.008
(0.057)
574
0.181
0.231

Obs.
Mean of D.V.
R2

0.029
(0.028)

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who as of September
2017 were expecting to graduate in 2017, 2018 and 2019, irrespective of whether they answered the final survey afterwards. The
dependent variable is whether the person actually started a postdoc as determined by manual searches. The coefficients reported
correspond to 4 different indicators for each treatment status (see main text for description). The omitted group is the survey
respondents who did not receive a thank-you message in universities where other respondents also did not receive a thank-you
message. The specification (1) does not include any controls. The specification (2) includes controls for gender, foreign status, field
of study, time in the program, and university rank. In specification (3) we additionally control for the initial level of beliefs.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank which was used to stratify the
block randomization.
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Table 6 Effect of the Interventions on Satisfaction with the PhD as a Career Choice
Historical placement info
treatment (block)

(1)
(2)
(3)
D.V.= Changes in satisfaction with the PhD as a career choice
0.281
0.024
0.031
(0.311)
(0.358)
(0.348)

Role model treatment

−0.648
(0.374)

−0.774
(0.455)

−0.814*
(0.442)

Historical placement info
treatment (individual)

0.006
(0.535)

−0.075
(0.583)

−0.068
(0.535)

Some peers treated

0.714**
(0.333)
496
2.613
0.016

0.410
(0.326)
496
2.613
0.084

0.351
(0.288)
496
2.613
0.106

N
Mean of D.V.
R2

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who answered both the
initial and follow-up survey. The dependent variable is the change in respondents’ satisfaction with choosing a PhD as career track.
The coefficients reported correspond to four different indicators for each treatment status (see main text for description). The
omitted group is the survey respondents who did not receive a thank-you message in universities where other respondents also did
not receive a thank-you message. The specification (1) does not include any controls. The specification (2) includes controls for
gender, foreign status, field of study, time in the program, and university rank. In specification (3) we additionally control for the
initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank which
was used to stratify the block randomization.
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Table 7A Effect of the Interventions on Perceived Attractiveness of Faculty Position
Historical placement info treatment
(block)

(1)
(2)
(3)
D.V.= Changes in the attractiveness of faculty positions
0.237***
0.298***
0.298***
(0.077)
(0.094)
(0.088)

Role model treatment

0.102
(0.166)

0.129
(0.181)

0.132
(0.188)

Historical placement info treatment
(individual)

0.196*
(0.111)

0.216*
(0.110)

0.214*
(0.111)

Some peers treated

0.081
(0.190)
500
−0.288
0.009

0.151
(0.204)
500
−0.288
0.089

0.154
(0.210)
500
−0.288
0.096

N
Mean of D.V.
R2

Table 7B Effect of the interventions on perceived attractiveness of gov’t R&D position
Historical placement info treatment
(block)

(1)
(2)
(3)
D.V.= Changes in the attractiveness of gov’t R&D positions
0.025
0.003
0.029
(0.092)
(0.118)
(0.119)

Role model treatment

0.184
(0.119)

0.259*
(0.128)

0.272**
(0.128)

Historical placement info treatment
(individual)

0.136
(0.164)

0.177
(0.174)

0.173
(0.171)

Some peers treated

0.168
(0.136)
500
−0.084

0.170
(0.153)
500
−0.084

0.191
(0.159)
500
−0.084

N
Mean of D.V.

R2
0.006
0.056
0.076
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who answered both the
initial and follow-up survey. The dependent variable is the change in perceived attractiveness of faculty positions for Panel A and
of government R&D positions for Panel B (reported attractiveness in the final survey minus reported attractiveness in the initial
survey). Attractiveness is measured on a 1–5 scale. The coefficients reported correspond to four different indicators for each
treatment status (see main text for description). The omitted group is the survey respondents who did not receive a thank-you
message in universities where other respondents also did not receive a thank-you message. The specification (1) does not include
any controls. The specification (2) includes controls for gender, foreign status, field of study, time in the program, and university
rank. In specification (3) we additionally control for the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster
is a group of three universities of similar rank which was used to stratify the block randomization.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance
Table A1 Descriptive Statistics on Baseline Survey Respondents (n=1,330)
Chances of publishing in Nature/Science/Cell
Chances of becoming TT faculty in a U.S. research- intensive university
Share of students becoming faculty in U.S. research-intensive university
Likelihood of doing a postdoc
Likelihood of choosing postdoc among three options
Female
Foreign
Top-10 school
Year in doctoral program
First year
Second year
Third year
Field of study
Analytical chemistry
Biological/biochemistry
Inorganic chemistry
Medical/clinical/pharmaceutical chemistry
Organic chemistry
Physical chemistry
Polymer chemistry
Theoretical/computational chemistry
Other
Obs.

41

Mean
24.91
24.47
23.95
54.13
25.52
0.42
0.28
0.20

S.D.
29.90
17.76
25.38
31.32
24.75
0.49
0.45
0.40

0.19
0.21
0.19

0.39
0.40
0.40

0.11
0.18
0.16
0.01
0.18
0.16
0.04
0.07
0.09
1,330

0.32
0.38
0.37
0.12
0.38
0.36
0.20
0.25
0.28

Table A2 Descriptive Statistics on final survey respondents (n=500)
Change in beliefs of the share of students becoming faculty
Changes in beliefs of own chances to become faculty
Historical placement info treatment (block)
Role model treatment
Historical placement info treatment (individual)
Some peers treated
Female
Foreign
Top-10 school
Year in doctoral program
First year
Second year
Third year
Field of study
Analytical chemistry
Biological/biochemistry
Inorganic chemistry
Medical/clinical/pharmaceutical chemistry
Organic chemistry
Physical chemistry
Polymer chemistry
Theoretical/computational chemistry
Other
Obs.

Mean
−3.52
−3.74
0.31
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.47
0.17
0.25

S.D.
15.70
20.28
0.46
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.50
0.38
0.43

0.21
0.28
0.22

0.40
0.45
0.41

0.11
0.17
0.17
0.01
0.17
0.17
0.04
0.07
0.07

0.32
0.38
0.37
0.12
0.38
0.38
0.20
0.26
0.26

500
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Table A3 Descriptive Statistics on Sample with Actual Placement Data (n=574)
Started a postdoc
Change in beliefs of the share of students becoming faculty
Changes in beliefs of own chances to become faculty
Historical placement info treatment (block)
Role model treatment
Female
Foreign
Top-10 school
Year in doctoral program
First year
Second year
Third year
Field of study
Analytical chemistry
Biological/biochemistry
Inorganic chemistry
Medical/clinical/pharmaceutical chemistry
Organic chemistry
Physical chemistry
Polymer chemistry
Theoretical/computational chemistry
Other
Obs.

43

Mean
0.18
0.29
0.16
0.12
0.13
0.44
0.26
0.20

S.D.
0.39
0.45
0.36
0.32
0.34
0.50
0.44
0.40

0.01
0.04
0.38

0.10
0.20
0.49

0.11
0.17
0.18
0.02
0.17
0.14
0.06
0.07
0.08
574

0.32
0.38
0.38
0.12
0.38
0.35
0.23
0.25
0.27

Table A4 Is There Differential Selection into the Follow-up Survey?

(1)
Responded follow-up survey
−0.044
(0.034)
−0.094**
(0.042)
−0.044
(0.045)
−0.058
(0.044)
−0.147***
(0.031)
0.022
(0.027)
0.091***
(0.033)
0.127***
(0.036)
0.194***
(0.035)
0.128***
(0.036)

Historical placement info treatment (block)
Role model treatment
Historical placement info treatment (individual)
Some peers treated
Foreign student
Female
Top-10 school
First-year student
Second-year student
Third-year student
Field study
Analytical chemistry
Biological/biochemistry
Inorganic chemistry
Medical/clinical/pharmaceutical chemistry
Physical chemistry
Polymer chemistry
Theoretical/computational chemistry
Other
Constant
Obs.
Mean of D.V.

0.020
0.006
0.007
0.022
0.044
−0.012
0.043
−0.042
0.322***
1,330
0.375

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Organic chemistry excluded.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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(0.050)
(0.044)
(0.044)
(0.113)
(0.045)
(0.070)
(0.058)
(0.054)
(0.043)

Table A5 Effects of the Interventions Pooling the Historical Placement Info Treatment into
One Variable

Historical placement info
treatment (block +
individual)
Role model
treatment
Some peers treated
Obs.
Controls
Mean of D.V.
R2

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Change in beliefs Changes in
Changes in
of the share of beliefs of own
satisfaction with Changes in the
students
chances to Started a postdoc the PhD as a attractiveness of
becoming faculty become faculty
after PhD
career choice faculty positions
−0.245
−2.761
0.018
−0.081
0.261***
(1.453)
(1.663)
(0.028)
(0.347)
(0.056)
0.254
(2.045)

−6.012**
(2.194)

−0.025
(0.041)

−0.710
(0.410)

0.133
(0.184)

−0.640
−2.712
0.009
0.333
0.145
(1.862)
(2.750)
0.056
(0.248)
(0.189)
500
500
574
496
500
Demographics, Demographics, Demographics, Demographics, Demographics,
field + Initial
field + Initial
field + Initial
field + Initial
field + Initial
beliefs
beliefs
beliefs
beliefs
beliefs
−3.520
−3.736
0.181
2.613
−0.288
0.374
0.273
0.230
0.171
0.129

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions correspond to the column of tables 3–7 except that historical placement
info treatment (block) and historical placement info treatment (individual) are pooled instead of being entered separately. The
omitted group is the group of survey respondents who did not receive a thank-you message in universities where other respondents
also did not receive a thank-you message. All specification control for gender, foreign status, time in the program, university rank,
and the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank,
which was used to stratify the block randomization.
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Table A6 Heterogeneity: Effects of the Interventions on Peer and Own Beliefs by Baseline
Beliefs

Historical placement info treatment (block)

(1)
(2)
Change in beliefs of the share of Changes in beliefs of own chances
students becoming faculty
to become faculty
3.498
−0.049
(3.075)
(2.092)

Role model treatment

−2.419
(2.805)

−0.781
(2.650)

Historical placement info treatment
(individual)

5.823
(4.352)

−3.320
(3.164)

Some peers treated

6.758**
(2.823)

−3.037
(2.838)

Historical placement info treatment (block) ×
Baseline beliefs

−0.161
(0.157)

−0.153*
(0.081)

Role model treatment × Baseline beliefs

0.117
(0.118)

−0.233**
(0.089)

Historical placement info treatment
(individual) × Baseline beliefs

−0.205
(0.170)

0.028
(0.072)

Some peers treated × Baseline beliefs

−0.272*
(0.146)

0.023
(0.114)

N
Mean of D.V.
R2

500
−3.520
0.351

500
−3.736
0.263

NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All specification control for gender, foreign status, time in the program, university rank
and the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank
which was used to stratify the block randomization.
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Table A7 Heterogeneity: Effects of the Interventions on Peer and Own Beliefs

Covariate 
Historical placement info treatment (block)

(1)
(2)
(3)
Change in beliefs of the share of students becoming
faculty
Female
Foreign
Top Univ.
0.951
2.127
1.796
(1.967)
(1.409)
(3.872)

(4)
(5)
(6)
Changes in beliefs of own chances to become faculty
Female
−7.061***
(1.438)

Foreign
−4.784**
(1.698)

Top Univ.
−1.857
(2.928)

Role model treatment

1.891
(2.520)

1.297
(2.805)

1.886
(5.928)

−2.481
(2.981)

−6.478**
(2.672)

−5.600
(4.711)

Historical placement info treatment
(individual)

−2.088
(3.429)

1.498
(2.756)

−2.837
(4.154)

−2.272
(5.055)

−2.273
(2.481)

5.261
(3.582)

Some peers treated

0.119
(2.861)

3.870*
(2.118)

1.166
(3.159)

−1.200
(2.810)

−2.286
(4.038)

−0.792
(2.549)

Historical placement info treatment (block) ×
Covariate

−0.416
(3.858)

−7.759*
(3.948)

−1.444
(4.176)

4.495
(3.522)

−1.516
(7.078)

−3.991
(3.995)

Role model treatment × Covariate

−4.322
(3.752)

−7.278**
(3.006)

−2.823
(6.441)

−9.201
(5.585)

−0.387
(5.730)

−2.144
(5.593)

Historical placement info treatment
(individual) × Covariate

6.212
(5.117)

−0.155
(16.610)

4.921
(5.047)

−1.655
(7.842)

−7.616
(9.300)

−11.503**
(4.304)

Some peers treated × Covariate

2.337
(4.722)
500
−3.520
0.067

−12.565
(7.954)
500
−3.520
0.071

0.163
(4.256)
500
−3.520
0.064

−5.043
(6.729)
500
−3.736
0.098

−5.137
(9.168)
500
−3.736
0.088

−4.173
(5.328)
500
−3.736
0.096

N
Mean of D.V.
R2
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Figure A1 Gender Differences in Beliefs about the Share of PhD from Their Program
Becoming Faculty

48

Appendix B Universities Included in the Sampling Frame
Arizona State University

University of California, Irvine

California Institute of Technology

University of California, Los Angeles

Carnegie Mellon University

University of California, Riverside

Colorado State University

University of California, San Diego

Columbia University

University of California, Santa Barbara

Cornell University

University of Chicago

Duke University

University of Colorado

Emory University

University of Delaware

Georgia Institute of Technology

University of Florida

Harvard University

University of Houston

Indiana University

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Iowa State University

University of Maryland, College Park

Johns Hopkins University

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

University of Michigan

North Carolina State University

University of Minnesota

Northwestern University

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Princeton University

University of Pennsylvania

Purdue University

University of Pittsburgh

Rice University

University of South Florida

Stanford University

University of Southern California

State University of New York at Buffalo

University of Utah

Texas A&M University

University of Virginia

The Ohio State University

University of Washington

The Pennsylvania State University

University of Wisconsin-Madison

The University of Texas at Austin

Washington State University

University of California, Berkeley

Washington University in St. Louis

University of California, Davis

Yale University
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Appendix C Information on Graduates’ Placements from University Webpages

chem.duke.edu/
graduate/placements

www.chem.purdue.edu/
Analytical/placement.php

https://secure.rackham.umich.edu/
graduate-student-success/alumniprofiles/

chemistry.princeton.edu/
graduate/after-princeton

NOTE: We visited websites of 56 U.S. chemistry research-intensive universities in search for the information they publish on their graduates’ placements. We looked through their
graduate studies’ main pages, graduate student handbooks, career pages, alumni profiles, and news section.
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Appendix D: Selected Survey Questions
Measuring beliefs about the academic job market
Q.

What do you think is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you will eventually
have a tenure-track position in a U.S. research-intensive university?
Not likely
0

Somewhat
likely

Very likely

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

How likely you will have a tenure-track
position in the US? ()
Q.

Approximately what share of PhD graduates from your PhD program do you think
eventually obtain a tenure-track position in a US research-intensive university? (0 means
“None” and 100 means “All”).
0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Share of students with a tenure-track position
in the US ()

Measuring beliefs about postdoctoral training
Q.

What do you think is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you will do a
postdoc after your PhD?
Not likely
0
How likely are you to do a postdoc? ()
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Somewhat
likely

Very likely

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Measuring career preferences – counterfactual choice question
Q.

Now we want to ask you to do some simple evaluations of potential job offers. Imagine
that you have just completed your dissertation and are looking for a full-time
position.
First, suppose you have the following job offers and you need to choose between them.
Please rate how likely you are to accept one of them rather than the other. For each job
offer, choose the percent chance (out of 100) of choosing each one. The total chances
given to each offer should add up to 100.
_______ Job Offer #1: Research Scientist/Engineer at Private Sector Firm (e.g. DuPont,
Novartis) Annual Salary: $90,000 (1)
_______ Job Offer #2: Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Top U.S. university (e.g.
Berkeley, MIT) Annual Salary: $50,000 (2)
_______ Job Offer #3: Assistant Professor at top liberal arts college (e.g. Swarthmore
College) Annual Salary: $70,000 (3)

Q.

Putting job availability aside, how attractive do you personally find each of the following
careers?

Academic faculty with an
emphasis on research (1)
Academic faculty with an
emphasis on teaching (2)
Government research and
development position (3)
Government (other) (6)
Industry position with an
emphasis on research and
development (4)
Industry (other) (5)

Not at all
attractive
(1)

o
o
o
o
o
o

Mostly not
attractive
(2)

o
o
o
o
o
o
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Neutral
(3)

o
o
o
o
o
o

Mostly
Very attractive
attractive (4)
(5)

o
o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

Appendix E: Measuring Historical Placement Rates
Overview
The objective of this data collection effort was to understand what share of PhD graduates from
U.S. chemistry departments become faculty members themselves (in research-intensive
universities), and differences across schools. To reach this objective, we collected data on students
graduating from U.S. chemistry graduate programs between 2008 and 2010 and matched their
names to a 2015 list of chemistry faculty in research-intensive universities. We then computed the
share of graduating students who had become faculty by 2015, by graduating department.
Data sources
The database “Proquest Dissertations and Abstracts” was used to obtain the list of chemistry
dissertations completed between 2008 and 2010. Proquest Dissertations and Abstracts includes the
names of students, the year and university of graduation as well as a subject classification for the
thesis, among other information. While the database itself is generally thought to be quite
comprehensive, it does not clearly indicate from which department the student graduated. This
implies that one must deduce whether it was a chemistry dissertation from the subject classification.
For lists of chemistry faculty, we relied on the ACS Directory of Graduate Research, available
online at dgr.rints.com. This resource, meant to help prospective graduate students choose a
graduate program, has an extensive listing of faculty members in U.S. PhD-granting chemistry,
chemical engineering, and biochemistry programs. The ACS Directory of Graduate Research was
used to create a list of faculty members in U.S. research-intensive universities, where research
intensive is defined as “R1” or “R2” in the Carnegie classification.
An important limitation is that it does not list faculty members outside the United States as well as
in nonchemistry departments, where PhD chemistry graduates may find employment as university
faculty with a focus on research.
Matching
The list of graduate students was matched to the list of faculty using last names, initials, first names,
year of graduation, and university of graduation. The matching algorithm is robust enough to
handle cases of variations in spelling of first names, inconsistent reporting of middle names, or
individuals changing last names.
Limitations of the placement data
The placement data presented here have a few important limitations.
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First, some truncation bias arises from the fact that faculty placements are observed as of 2015,
while the list of students include students who graduated relatively recently (say, 2010) and may
have obtained a faculty position in 2016 or 2017, or may obtain a faculty position in the future.
Second, the placement data fail to capture placement in nonchemistry departments that may employ
chemistry PhD students, as well as placements outside the United States.
Third, students outside chemistry departments may be mistakenly assigned to the chemistry
department if the subject classification of their thesis is close to chemistry, which could impact the
placement measures.
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Appendix F: Websites Linked in the Thank-You Emails
Custom-built website with historical placement information

American Chemical Society “Chemists in the Real World” website listing profiles of professional
scientists in both academic and industry occupations
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Appendix G: Web Analytics on Visits to the Website with Historical Placement Information
Figure G1 Share of Visitors Accessing the Website: www.chemistryplacementdata.com by
Source Assessed
% of visitors
Twitter
1%

Direct search
16%

Survey
37%

Thank you e-mail
29%
Google
3%

Facebook
14%

Figure G2 Share of Respondents Who Visited Website According to Treatment Status
70%

64.83%

60%
50%
40%

35.16%
27.52%

30%
20%

11.75%

10%
0%

1.53% 0.92%
Placement info

Control group

Placement info or
ASC profiles info or
Control group
(student-level
randomization)
Percentage of students who visited webpage

5.20%
Not in the sample

Share of survey respondents who visited webpage using sources
we could track
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